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Background
he concept of depression as a disease goes back
a long way.Hippocrates described melancholia as a con-
dition in which patients had fears and despondencies for
a long time.
1 Robert Burton's book, Anatomy of
Melancholy, from 1621, is a most interesting read, and
many of the descriptions are still applicable.
2 In the last
200 years many concepts have been introduced into the
classification of depression,including manic-depressive
disorder/insanity,
3 bipolar disorder,
4 and depression.
5,6
Kraepelin's original concept of manic-depressive disor-
der has evolved into the concept of polarity,and bipolar
and depressive disorders. During the last century, psy-
chiatric classification has been characterized by an infla-
tion of diagnostic categories,and this includes the numer-
ous subtypes of depression (see the plethora of DSM
classification systems).Severity,duration,and recurrence
are used as bases for classification.This rapid multiplier
effect is primarily descriptive, and there is a need to
rethink,in a pragmatic fashion,the classification system
in order to create one that is likely to be of utility and
based on science.
As we move towards a classification of depression for
this century,it is worth taking a look at the basics of what
“disease” is. Disease is an attribute of the patient.The
major reason for having a disease label is to convey infor-
mation in shortened form to others,such that it provides
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Many concepts have been introduced into the classifica-
tion of depression, including manic-depressive/bipolar dis-
order depression, etc. Kraepelin's original concept of
manic-depressive disorder has evolved into the concept of
polarity, and bipolar and unipolar disorders. Psychiatric
classification is characterized by an inflation of the diag-
nostic categories, including subtypes of depression. This
rapid multiplier effect is primarily descriptive, and there is
a need to rethink, in a pragmatic fashion, the classifica-
tion system, in order to develop one that is likely to be of
utility and which has a scientific basis. Is the time now
right to ask whether there are essential conditions rele-
vant to depression? I think that it is, and here I will intro-
duce the notion with two such conditions. The first is early
life stress disorder, and the second vascular depression.
These conditions have reached a point where the data
supports them as distinct entities. In this paper, the ratio-
nale for this is discussed.
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of the condition.So,if someone states that a patient has
chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, everyone else
knows what this means. Disease is conceptualized and
taught as an invariant concept,but it is not one.It is fluid,
influenced by societal ideas that change with time and in
response to scientific trends.There are many definitions
of disease,but one practical and easily understandable
way to define it is to consider disease “as a state that
places individuals at increased risk of adverse conse-
quences.”
7A particular disease refers to the sum of the
abnormal elements,such as symptoms,course,signs,lab-
oratory findings,radiological and genetic information,
etc,shown by a definable entity,in terms of which they
differ from the norm (and from other entities) and in
such a manner as to place the subject at risk of adverse
consequences.
8This definition explains the factual impli-
cations of the names of diseases when used in diagnostic
statements. It relies on comparison with observable
norms.
8 Diagnosis is the act of labeling someone as dis-
eased;it reflects the probability that the patient has a dis-
ease.
Ideally,the characteristic or group of characteristics spec-
ifying the group of patients should be based on the exist-
ing state of knowledge.
8 Deviations from the norm,and
consequent risk,may or may not require formal statistical
information.The classification of adverse consequences
includes physical morbidity, mortality, and functional
impairment.
9 Most psychiatric diseases place patients at an
increased but variable risk for functional morbidity,and
only rarely influence mortality.Advances in knowledge
should result in the definition of characteristics.The ques-
tion is, how do we incorporate new knowledge and
develop new classification systems? The redefined diseases
are unlikely to be identical with the old, and could be a
radical departure from the previous definition.Depression
research is entering a phase in which redefinitions are
likely to occur,and therefore ground rules can be helpful.
Explicit ground rules can make the process of “creating”
diseases more transparent.
Defining psychiatric disease 
in a nominalist tradition
There are two methods of labeling disease.Nominalist
and essentialist.Nominalists label symptoms with a dis-
ease name, and etiology is not a factor. The current
approach to depression follows the symptom- and
course-based identification of syndromes/diseases.In this
tradition,the names of diseases are an easy way of briefly
stating the status of symptoms and signs as well as course.
The causes in this type of classification can be elusive.
Say,for instance,we find that patients with disease X,eg,
major depression,have an abnormal genetic marker.We
can use the data and develop them as a test to identify
specificity,sensitivity,etc.However,this approach relates
the changes only to that initial definition.If the definition
was not accurate in the first place, then it becomes a
problem. It can lead to a test for that condition, but it
does not change the definition of that condition based on
a presumed cause.Now let us say that the test is a muta-
tion in a gene,and that mutation links not just to depres-
sion but to anxiety disorder,bipolar disorder,attention
deficit disorder,etc then a symptom-based approach will
be disadvantageous.It is likely not to change our under-
standing,and may be an impediment to better identifi-
cation of subjects and treatments. An example of an
essentialist identification is Hepatitis B or C.Here,there
is no link to symptoms or signs—just to the cause.The
doctor’s skill then consists in identifying the causal dis-
ease and prescribing the appropriate treatment.This con-
cept of disease is not yet applicable in a broad sense to
psychiatry,because much less is known,and causation is
likely to be multifactorial.However,as evidence of cau-
sation develops,an essentialist mentality can move the
field forward.
The  Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders,4th edition (DSM-IV) points out that “there
is no assumption that each category of mental disorder is
a completely discrete entity with absolute boundaries
dividing it from other mental disorders or from no men-
tal disorder”(p 21),
10 but the mere fact that a diagnostic
concept is listed,official,and provided with a precise def-
inition makes it appear robust and specific.Definitions
are stated to become codified and reified without an
examination of the fundamental validity. Robins and
Guze
11 proposed formal criteria for establishing the valid-
ity of psychiatric diagnoses;however few of the entities
in DSM meet these criteria.As Kendell and others have
pointed out,it is likely that the concept of a nominalist
description of disease in the psychiatric context as a dis-
tinct entity may not be relevant.
6 One of the hallmarks
for symptom- and course-based identification is to
demonstrate points of nonoverlap between similar syn-
dromes.
9,11The points of rarity between psychiatric dis-
eases defined in a nominalist tradition are not as distinct
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sification may be very relevant.We have recently noted
a system for defining a condition as a disease.
Criteria for defining disease
The first and obvious criterion is that the condition
should be one that leads to a risk for adverse outcomes—
either mortality or functional impairment.
12
The second is where an identifiable characteristic genetic
or environmental factor or pathology can be clearly
defined.This characteristic should separate the entity
from similar entities,in terms of at least one of the fol-
lowing criteria:
1.Clinical symptoms 
2.Course and outcome
3.Familial pattern 
4.Treatment response.
The differentiation should be clinically significant.
Clinical significance may have to be adjudicated by col-
lective groups.The failure to separate may change over
time as additional information is developed,and may go
through a stage where the characteristic is considered as
a subentity.
12,13
Is the time right to ask whether there are potential essen-
tialist conditions relevant to depression? I think it is,and
I would like to introduce the notion of two such cate-
gories.The first is early life stress disorder,and the sec-
ond vascular depression;both these entities have reached
a point where the data appears to support their consid-
eration as distinct entities that are clinically significant.
Early life stress disorder
Early life stress disorder meets the essential require-
ments for what should be called a specific entity.The past
decade has seen an increasing awareness of the presence
and high incidence of child maltreatment.
14The National
Center of Child Abuse and Neglect reports approxi-
mately 1.5 million cases of child maltreatment annually
in the United States;half of these cases represent neglect,
and 700 000 cases are of sexual, physical, or emotional
abuse.In addition to child maltreatment,children often
experience other losses, such as the loss of a parent.
15
Thus,early childhood stress is quite common.In a ran-
dom sample of 1442 subjects from the United States,
14.2% of men and 32.3%,of women reported childhood
sexual abuse,and 22.2% of males and 19.5%,of females
reported physical abuse.
16 Childhood sexual and physical
abuse is common in the general population.So what do
we know about the effect of childhood stress?
There is overwhelming evidence that early life stress con-
stitutes a major risk factor for depression.Increased rates
of major depression, post-traumatic stress disorder
(PTSD), attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder, and
other behavioral disorders have been reported for mal-
treated children (eg, refs 17,18). A community-based
study of adult women revealed that those with a history
of childhood sexual or physical abuse had more symp-
toms of depression and anxiety and more frequently
attempted suicide than women without a history of child-
hood abuse.
19 Others have reported that major depres-
sion and anxiety disorders,including panic disorder and
PTSD,are frequent in adults with a history of childhood
abuse (eg, refs 20,21). Similar findings have been
reported for other instances of early life stress.For exam-
ple,early parental loss has been found to be related to
unipolar and bipolar depression,as well as anxiety dis-
orders,beyond familial or genetic factors.
22
One could argue therefore that early adverse experiences
may “shape”a preexisting genetic vulnerability to stress
and disease,resulting in a stable phenotype,with a cer-
tain risk of developing one syndrome or another in
response to further stress exposure.One can argue that
this constitutes the essential component of disease,ie,it
is state that places an individual at an increased risk for
adverse consequences.
This state can be defined as distinct from the rest of the
population,and in addition can be differentiated on the
following bases.
Clinical
By definition these individuals can exhibit a plethora of
symptoms ranging from anxiety,violent behavior,depres-
sion, personality disorder, drug abuse, etc. As noted
above,an overview of the literature shows that individu-
als who suffer abuse or neglect as children are more
likely to be depressed,to experience other types of psy-
chiatric illness,to have more physical symptoms,and to
engage in drug and alcohol abuse. Clearly, additional
work is needed to differentiate features.In fact when one
works with these patients it is interesting to note the flux
in symptom course and features over time. In real life,
few of these patients are likely to be true to any one cur-
rent diagnostic (DSM) entity.
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Childhood abuse strongly predicts poor psychiatric and
physical health outcomes in adulthood.Individuals with
a history of childhood abuse,particularly sexual abuse,
are more likely than individuals with no history of abuse
to become high utilizers of medical care and emergency
services.
Biological
Findings in children
Neuroendocrine dysfunction in children with early life
stress is highly variable,and likely influenced by multiple
factors. This could be because a stable phenotype of
altered stress vulnerability may not yet have developed
in children.Some studies report decreased salivary cor-
tisol concentrations in the morning or a lack of decline
of cortisol toward the evening,evidence of an altered cir-
cadian rhythm of the hypothalamo-pituitary-adrenal
(HPA) axis.
23-25 Cortisol concentrations are related to
symptoms of depression.Serotonergic dysfunction is also
seen in abused children.
26 In contrast to findings in adult
depression and PTSD, normal hippocampal volumes
have been observed in maltreated children with PTSD,
27
although smaller ratios of N-acetylasparate to creatine
have been found in the anterior cingulate of abused chil-
dren with PTSD.
28
Findings in adults
A limited number of retrospective studies have evaluated
the long-term consequences of early life stress in adults.
Lemieux and Coe
29 observed increased 24-hour urinary
cortisol excretion in women with a history of childhood
sexual abuse and PTSD.These findings,interestingly,are
opposite to findings in Vietnam veterans and Holocaust
survivors with PTSD.
30 Increased plasma cortisol con-
centrations are seen amongst patients who experienced
the death of a parent in childhood.
31 On the other hand,
women with a history of childhood sexual abuse were
found to show hypersuppression of salivary cortisol con-
centrations in response to a low dose of dexamethasone.
32
These data,even if they are variable,are consistent with
the notion that childhood abuse leaves a scar in the stress
response axis. Heim et al found that abused women
exhibit markedly increased plasma acetylcholine
(ACTH) responses to psychosocial laboratory stress and
in response to corticotrophin-releasing factor (CRF)
compared with control subjects and depressed women
without early life stress.
33 Similar changes are seen in the
sympathetic response.
29,34These findings are consistent
with findings from animal studies, suggesting that the
stress axis is sensitized after early life stress in humans
that could be due to an increased risk for psychopathol-
ogy. Decreased hippocampal volumes have been mea-
sured in adults with perinatal trauma and adult women
with child abuse and PTSD.
35 It is unclear whether this is
secondary to the trauma or pre-existent.
Treatment
Obviously the treatment of this entity has to be directed
towards prevention.However,it also has implications for
medication treatment. In one study, 681 patients with
chronic forms of major depression were treated with an
antidepressant (nefazodone), Cognitive Behavioral
Analysis System of Psychotherapy (CBASP),or the com-
bination.Overall,the effects of the antidepressant alone
and psychotherapy alone were equal,and significantly
less effective than combination treatment. However,
among those with a history of early childhood trauma
(loss of parents at an early age,physical or sexual abuse,
or neglect),psychotherapy alone was superior to antide-
pressant monotherapy.
36 Moreover,the combination of
psychotherapy and pharmacotherapy was only margin-
ally superior to psychotherapy alone among the child-
hood abuse cohort.This clearly has implications for man-
aging depression in the context of maltreatment.In fact,
this is one of the strongest arguments for defining early
life stress disorder as a distinct entity.Without definitions
and codification,the implications of research findings will
not be well translated,either for research or for clinical
purposes.
We do not have knowledge of many aspects of this entity.
That is,we do not know what the early features are,or
what the gene /environment interaction is.For example,
catechol-O-methyl trasferase (COMT) variation has
been implicated in predilection to violence in the context
of trauma and serotonin transporter genetic variation to
depression with the same context,ie,depending on the
genetic background,stress produces a different expres-
sion.
37 It is likely that clinical features of this entity will
not be just syndromal depression or symptoms of PTSD
but likely will include anxiety,aggression,and other fea-
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text or labeled as comorbidity.
Why the need to define early life stress disorder as an
entity?
The reason for calling a particular feature an entity
brings focus and attention.Thus, instead of evaluating
patients with depression and stating that a high propor-
tion suffered from trauma, and then stating that they
have high comorbidity etc,it reverses the focus and the
thinking pattern to a potential cause and the varied man-
ifestations of that cause.By implication,this can lead to
a focused search for understanding biology,better assess-
ment of risk prognosis, genetic and social factors, and
thereby better treatment and prevention.Given the high
estimated rates of this condition,such a focus is impera-
tive at both the research and clinical ends.
Vascular depression
The concept of vascular depression and its potential
labeling gives us cause to reflect on the state of labeling
psychiatric disorders and the challenges that lie ahead.
The concept of vascular depression is not a new idea.
Gaupp (1905) as quoted by F. Post
38 described elderly
patients with depression secondary to arteriosclerosis.
Many had persistent apathy and depressed mood.These
early findings were based purely on clinical evidence of
cerebral vascular lesions,typically strokes.Magnetic res-
onance imaging (MRI) and other imaging techniques
have allowed depiction of subtle but surprisingly wide-
spread structural brain change in vivo.
Our group and others have previously introduced the
notion of vascular depression (we initially used the term
arteriosclerotic depression),
39-41 and more precisely sub-
cortical ischemic depression (SID).The broader definition
of vascular depression encompasses both depression
related to stroke and cardiac disease, and perhaps even
hypertension. SID describes a more specific process, is
analogous to a recent description of subcortical ischemic
vascular dementia,
42 and is similar to what has previously
been termed MRI-defined vascular depression.
40We pro-
posed that diagnostic criteria
43 may be more specific to this
entity than the more broadly defined vascular depression.
The clinical syndrome meets requirements for diagnostic
validity.
44 SID has a clinical description,can be identified
through laboratory studies (MRI),can be delimited from
other disorders,is not associated with familial factors (for
depression),and the changes seen on MRI can influence
outcomes longitudinally.
45 The supporting evidence
includes the following points.Deep white matter and sub-
cortical lesions as evidence of ischemic disease are more
common in elderly depressed patients than healthy elderly
control subjects.
46-48 This has also been demonstrated in
community populations.
49 Family history of mental illness
is significantly less common amongst these patients com-
pared with those without these MRI changes. Large
prospective studies have shown that subcortical lesions
may be associated with persistence or worsening of
depressive symptoms over time.
50 There have also been
preliminary studies associating new onset of depression
with worsening subcortical disease,
51,52 and worsening of
lesion severity is associated with poor depression out-
comes.
53There is also evidence of pathophysiological and
neuroanatomical specificity,wherein lesions contributing
to depression occur in the basal ganglia and frontal
regions.
53,54The ischemic nature of these lesions has also
been shown,
54 and supports data associating severity of
subcortical lesions with vascular risk factors such as hyper-
tension,
55-57 and the development of late-onset depression
with a history of hypertension.
58
This description of vascular depression can be incorpo-
rated into our current nomenclature system.We took an
existing entity, major depression, and developed addi-
tional requirements specifying the criteria needed to call
it vascular depression or subcortical ischemic vascular
depression (SIVD). One significant limitation of this
nominalist approach is that it circumscribes the defini-
tion to a previously described phenomenon, and pre-
sumes that the depression related to this disease process
is akin to that noted in the previously described criteria.
This approach,although initially useful,is limiting and
incomplete.It does not reflect the fact that the disease
process is complex,and therefore can manifest with not
just lower grades of depression,but also other phenom-
ena including cognitive impairment,dementia psychoses,
and possibly mania at some point during the process and
in some cases concurrently.The danger is illustrated by
the tale of the five blind men and their description of the
elephant.The same entity is described in different ways,
based on the vantage point.The other approach would
be to recognize subcortical ischemic vascular disease as
the disease entity (see ref 58).Mood disturbances asso-
ciated with SID may clearly include the full criteria for
major depression, bipolar disorder,
59 or dysthymia. In
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likely associated with subcortical ischemia;however,with
the exception of International Classification of Diseases
(ICD) minor depression,our current diagnostic nomen-
clature does not well capture these other disturbances.
Other manifestations of SID include mild cognitive
impairment,dementia,stroke,falls,and psychoses.
Thus,labeling SID as the disease changes the emphasis to
a disease process and therefore brings into focus the treat-
ment of the disease process,recognizing varying manifes-
tations and progression,for example,from mild cognitive
impairment and/or depression to dementia.This focus now
allows for the exploration of the causes of the disease
process,and thereby enhances the likelihood of develop-
ing treatments that are more specific. This process has
started for this entity from a neurological and geriatric
medicine perspective. The varied clinical symptoms
expressed will obviously need symptomatic treatment as
is the case for depression,anxiety,mania,or dementia.This
will allow the development of trials specific to this popu-
lation,to assess the response patterns and suitability of dif-
ferent treatment approaches.This focus also allows the
development of treatment and prevention approaches
aimed towards the underlying causes.In the case of SID
the causes are likely to be manifold in most instances.In
some cases there may be just one cause,for example cere-
bral autosomal dominant arteriopathy with subcortical
infarcts and leukoencephalopathy (CADASIL).When the
cause is identified,ie,CADASIL due to Notch 3 mutation,
then the primary disease entity should be the causal entity.
This is an example where the labeling moves from symp-
tom to disease process and eventually to a causal level.
60
As psychiatry moves from a purely phenomenological
symptom course-based approach and follows the trends in
medicine,our nomenclature will have to move toward a
disease process and/or causally based nomenclature.The
time for this change appears to be rapidly approaching.At
this time,research is suggesting that some genes are risk
factors for what have until now been regarded as unre-
lated syndromes.Most patients with psychiatric disease
may have many attributable causes;in that case,common
disease process-based descriptions will need to be devel-
oped,just as in the case of SIVD.
Conclusion
I have used two conditions to suggest a potential new
taxonomy for depression. The one striking aspect of
defining it on this basis is dropping the word “comorbid-
ity”in this context.When we classify using a non-nomi-
nalist approach, the basic terminology is altered.
Common co-occurrence of disorders gives us clues that
could be helpful in looking for antecedents, and at the
same time tell us that perhaps our current method is
blinding our vision. As we open our eyes and look at
emerging data in a nonbiased light,other conditions will
emerge that could be useful in conveying information
and treating patients.One cautionary note is the danger
of overinterpreting genetic information. As potential
genes at risk for one or more depressive disorders are
identified and developed, defining the level of harm
attributable to the gene is important,because any behav-
ior associated with a genetic abnormality is in danger of
being construed as disease-associated.This can overem-
phasize the genetic contribution of any one gene to dis-
ease etiology,and may lexicalize behavior patterns with
unfortunate consequences.Patients with a genetic varia-
tion who are at minimal or no increased risk for adverse
consequences should not be labeled as diseased.If the
definition of disease is based solely on a genetic abnor-
mality rather than on a clear specification of the risk,the
label may harm the patient.❏
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Hacia una taxonomía científica de la 
depresión
Dentro de la clasificación de la depresión se han
introducido muchos conceptos, incluyendo el tras-
torno depresivo maníacodepresivo/bipolar, etc. El
concepto original de Kraepelin de trastorno maní-
aco-depresivo ha evolucionado hacia el concepto
de polaridad en el trastorno bipolar y unipolar. La
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diversos subtipos de depresión. Este rápido efecto
multiplicador es primariamente descriptivo y es
necesario repensar de una manera pragmática el
sistema de clasificación, en orden a desarrollar
alguno que se espera sea útil y que cuente con
bases científicas. ¿Es ahora el momento adecuado
para preguntarse si existen condiciones de base que
puedan ser relevantes para la depresión? Yo pienso
que sí, y aquí yo introduciré esta noción con dos de
estas condiciones. La primera es el trastorno por
estrés precoz en la vida, y la segunda es la depre-
sión vascular. Estas condiciones han alcanzado un
nivel en que los datos obtenidos las sustentan como
entidades distintas. En este artículo se discuten los
fundamentos de esto. 
Vers une taxonomie scientifique de la
dépression
La classification de la dépression inclut de nom-
breuses notions, dont celles de troubles maniaco-
dépressifs/dépression bipolaire etc. Le concept ori-
ginal de trouble maniacodépressif de Kraepelin a
évolué vers l’idée de polarité, et de troubles uni- ou
bipolaires. La classification psychiatrique se carac-
térise par l’inflation de différentes catégories dia-
gnostiques comme celle des sous-types de dépres-
sion, cet effet multiplicateur étant essentiellement
descriptif. Le système de classification doit être
repensé de façon pragmatique sur des bases scien-
tifiques afin de pouvoir être utile. Est-ce le bon
moment pour se demander si certains états patho-
logiques sont essentiels dans la dépression ? Je
pense que oui, et je vais le démontrer avec deux
exemples : le premier est le stress précoce en début
de vie, et le second est la dépression vasculaire,
deux manifestations considérées par les données
comme des entités distinctes. Cet article propose la
démonstration des deux exemples.
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